CES: Electoral Coordination, Legislative Cohesion, and the Rise of the Modern Mass Party: The Limits of Majoritarian Representation in Germany, 1890‐1918

Explanations for the introduction of proportional representation (PR) in the first quarter of the 20th century focus primarily on parties’ expected losses of seats. We challenge the underlying presumption that parties can be treated as unitary actors. Instead, we argue that absolute majority rule (MR) in place in most Western European countries before the switch to PR did not threaten established parties’ electoral success, but their legislative cohesion. *Please note: There will be no presentation at this seminar. Attendees are expected to read a paper and be prepared to enter into a discussion. The paper for each discussion is posted in advance on the seminar's page on the CES website.
Phillip Manow Professor of Comparative Political Economy, Faculty of Social Sciences; University of Bremen Valentin Schröder Professor of Political Science, University of Bremen
Sponsors: Seminar on the State and Capitalism since 1800
Contact: Peter Hall, phall@fas.harvard.edu